Freeze on junk bond fund redemptions hints at no-bid risk
US mutual fund manager Third Avenue Funds’ justified its decision on Wednesday to gate redemptions from its Focused Credit Fund (FCF) as follows:
“We believe that, with time, FCF would have been able to realize investment returns in the normal course. Investor requests for redemption, however, in addition to the general reduction of liquidity in the fixed income markets, have made it impracticable for FCF going forward to create sufficient cash to pay anticipated redemptions without resorting to sales at prices that would unfairly disadvantage the remaining shareholders.”
Instead, investors remaining in the fund will be placed in a Liquidating Trust and will have to wait for the return of their money until the fund manager can dispose of the assets at what it calls “reasonable prices”. That may take months or more.
US mutual fund investors entering and exiting a fund do so on the basis of the fund’s net asset value (NAV), which is hard to determine in illiquid markets. If exiting investors are able to do so at prices that do not reflect the liquidity of the underlying market, they obtain an unfair advantage over those remaining in the fund, whose interests are diluted.
A central question is unanswered in Third Avenue Funds’ statement. Why not mark down the fund’s NAV until it reflects the price at which its portfolio of junk bonds can be sold?
Marking fund NAVs to the “bid” side of quotes in the portfolio is common practice in a bond fund, since it represents the most conservative approach. A portfolio of assets is realistically worth what it can be sold at.
The fact that Third Avenue felt unable to do this is the most worrying aspect of its fund closure. There are persistent reports that liquidity in junk bonds is so poor that a request to market makers for a quote on a portfolio can be left unanswered. Bonds go “no-bid”, in other words. As a former market maker in emerging market debt, I remember from the Russian crisis of 1998 that the market could simply stop and there was no prospect of selling your holdings at all.
The risk of bond illiquidity reoccurring on its scale has been masked by central banks’ zero interest rate policies. As many have argued, putting illiquid, higher-yielding assets in funds promising daily liquidity to investors has created large-scale structural risk. In simple terms, it’s been an accident waiting to happen. Following Third Avenue Funds’ decision to suspend redemptions, the managers of other funds investing in junk bonds, bank loans and emerging market debt will be looking nervously over their shoulders.